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Abstract 
Understanding how contagion works among financial institutions is a top priority for regulators 
and policy makers who aim to foster financial stability and to prevent financial crises. Using 
bank credit default swap (CDS) data, we provide a framework for the evaluation of contagion 
among banks in different countries and regions during a period of prolonged financial distress. 
We measure contagion in terms of return spillovers, following a Generalized VAR (GVAR) 
approach. In addition, we propose an innovative framework to distinguish between two types of 
contagion: systematic (linked to global factors), and idiosyncratic (linked to bank specific 
factors). We find evidence of both types of contagion, although the spillover dynamics changed 
over time. Our measure of systematic contagion is always greater than the idiosyncratic 
component, thus highlighting the importance of common factors in the propagation of risk 
spillovers. This indicates that international linkages among banking markets are central to the 
transmission of shocks.  
 
 
Keywords: Credit Default Swaps, Contagion, GVAR, Spillover Indices, Financial 
Stability 
 
JEL classification: G01, G21, C58 
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1. Introduction 
The turmoil that hit in the world's financial systems in the summer of 2007 has spurred a new 
debate on bank fragility and contagion. The concept of bank fragility generally refers to increased 
bank risk taking, leading to higher probability of default. To evaluate bank fragility regulators have 
traditionally employed bank balance sheet data; although more recently market signals are considered 
a useful complement to supervisors’ traditional accounting information (Gropp et al., 2006).1 In 
financial markets, the propensity for bank-specific risks to spillover to other banks and then to the rest 
of the economy is often seen as contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000). Understanding how contagion 
works among financial institutions is currently a top priority for regulators and policy makers who 
need put in place frameworks for the prevention of financial crises. In addition, the recent eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis highlighted the importance of cross-border linkages in transmitting local 
conditions across national borders (Tonzer, 2015), as well as the bank and sovereign risk feedback 
loops (Acharya et al, 2014; De Bruyckere et al, 2013).  
In this paper we evaluate the dynamics of international bank risk transmission and present an 
empirical method to measure contagion. More specifically, in this analysis contagion relates to the 
notion that events in one bank/country/portfolio spillover to another bank/country/portfolio through 
banks’ cross-border linkages. We therefore use the terms contagion and spillovers as synonyms, and 
we define contagion as the spillover effect occurring following a shock. In this setting, for contagion 
to occur, it needs a trigger or a shock, which amplifies the interdependence or co-movement across 
variables. Our aim is to shed some light on the potential triggers of contagion in banking markets as 
well as the channels through which contagion occurs. In line with recent literature, we use the credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads of major international banks as an indicator of bank credit risk.2 CDS 
spreads have a number of advantages in proxing for credit risk, including a more accurate 
                                                 
1
 As proxies of bank fragility, empirical studies use measures of bank insolvency risk, either based on 
accounting data (the z-scores) or on market data (using variations of the Merton Distance-to-Default models). 
2
 A CDS is essentially an insurance contract against a credit event of a specific reference entity. The CDS spread 
is the periodic rate that a protection buyer pays on the notional amount to the protection seller for transferring 
the risk of a credit event for some period. Since late 2008, the CDS market has attracted considerable attention 
and CDS are considered a good proxy for bank riskiness and default probability. For a survey of the literature on 
CDS, see Augustin et al. (2014).   
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measurement of default risk and higher liquidity (Blanco et al., 2005; Longstaff et al., 2005; Zhang et 
al., 2009; Yang and Zhou, 2013). Despite these characteristics, the use of CDS data on financial 
institutions is fairly recent and it came to prominence only as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis (Stulz, 2010; Eichengreen et al., 2012).  
We estimate contagion following a generalized vector autoregressive framework (GVAR) 
approach (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). GVAR is a VAR-based spillover index particularly suited for 
the investigation of systems of highly interdependent variables. The methodology allows us to 
identify the dynamics of the interactions over time and to examine both total and directional 
spillovers. In addition, we propose an innovative framework to distinguish between systematic and 
idiosyncratic contagion. To this end, we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the 
common factors underlying the correlations among the CDS returns series of individual banks over 
the sample period. In our setup, systematic contagion captures the spillover effects due to changes in 
global factors that affect all banks, whereas idiosyncratic contagion measures the spillover effects 
caused by changes in bank fundamentals. This decomposition allows us to assess to what extent the 
increase in bank fragility over the crises period was driven by deteriorating bank fundamentals and 
increased bank-specific risk taking or whether it reflected decline in global economic and financial 
conditions that affected all banks as an asset class. 
We find evidence of contagion in banking markets, documented by an increase in co-
movements in CDS returns and confirmed by the results of the GVAR estimations. Contagion came in 
different waves, with the financial and eurozone crises being distinct episodes with different spillover 
dynamics. Our results suggest that international linkages among banking markets are central to the 
transmission of shocks. Our measure of systematic contagion is always greater than the idiosyncratic 
component, thus highlighting the importance of common factors in the propagation of risk spillovers. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We bring together the literature on financial 
contagion and the literature on systematic risk to provide a better understanding of how contagion 
works in the banking sector. As a novel contribution of the paper, we provide evidence of the time 
variation of the transmission of credit risk at different stages of the prolonged global crisis by 
analysing contagion in US and European banking markets during the period January 2004 to March 
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2013. We do so in a rolling framework, which enables us to analyse the evolution of contagion over 
time and during a number of "phases" of market instability. We then put forward an interpretation of 
how contagion spread, by identifying spillover channels among banking markets. By proposing a 
novel framework for the identification of systematic and idiosyncratic contagion, we also contribute 
to the literature that develops measures of financial contagion. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature; Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents some preliminary analysis. Section 5 
discusses the methodological approach. Section 6 presents the results while section 7 provides some 
robustness checks. Section 8 reports the results of some additional analysis and Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The global financial crisis and the subsequent eurozone crisis highlighted the importance of risk 
spillovers, or contagion, across international banking and financial markets. Although a very intuitive 
concept, contagion is difficult to define and measure empirically. This has lead to various definitions 
and a large body of literature. A common approach to measure contagion is the analysis of correlation 
coefficients across markets or assets returns and an increase in correlation is seen as evidence of 
contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2005; Broto and Perez-Quiros, 2015). However, 
financial institutions are highly interconnected through a network composed of the interbank market, 
the payment system, the financial markets and so on. Similarly, economies are interconnected through 
financial and trade linkages. Interconnectedness describes situations when financial distress in one 
institution (country) significantly increases the probability of financial distress in other institutions 
(countries). The globalization of trade and markets has strengthened these linkages or 
interconnections, which are also described as spillovers channels of interdependence. When two 
markets exhibit a high degree of co-movement during stable periods, and these co-movements do not 
increase significantly after a shock, then it is interdependence rather than contagion (Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002). However, increased co-movements heighten the risk that financial distress 
originating in a few institutions can spread to many others and ultimately impact upon the real 
economy (Yang and Zhou, 2013).  
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In the first instance, contagion can be defined as the transmission of shocks over and above 
what is expected by the interdependence described above. Dornbusch et al. (2000), Kaminsky et al.  
(2003), Bae et al. (2003) and Longstaff (2010), among others, define contagion as an episode in 
which there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages when a shock occurs. In banking 
markets, contagion can be seen as a negative externality triggered by one institution in distress that 
affects other market participants. This initial trigger effect needs to be of abnormal speed, strength and 
scope to cause contagion, which can therefore be seen as the extreme amplification of spillover effects 
(Alter and Beyer, 2014).  
Our contribution builds upon this latter strand of the literature and we define contagion as the 
spillover effect that follows a shock in a region/portfolio to other regions/portfolios. By proposing an 
innovative framework to distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic contagion, we also 
contribute to the strand of the literature that focuses on the development of methods to evaluate 
contagion. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) review different definitions and related measures of contagion, 
including changes in the probability of currency crises; volatility spillovers (commonly based on the 
estimation of multivariate GARCH type models); Markov-switching models to test for jumps between 
multiple equilibria; correlation or co-movements in financial markets and changes in the transmission 
mechanism, that is when a country-specific shock becomes global. All methodologies have limitations 
and a number of caveats often apply. More recently, a growing body of the literature has focused on 
sovereign contagion within the eurozone (see, among others, Caceres et al, 2010; Beirne and 
Fratzscher, 2013; Alter and Beyer, 2014; Caporin et al, 2015) or on the bank/sovereign risk spillovers 
(De Bruyckere et al, 2013; Acharya et al, 2014). Our study also complements this strand of the 
literature and contributes to the understanding of the cross-border channel of bank risk spillovers 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Degryse et al, 2010; Tonzer, 2015). 
 
3.Data  
3.1 The Dataset 
To identify the transmission mechanism of credit risk among banking sectors, we collected 
daily CDS spreads from the Thomson Datastream database provided by CMA New York, for all 
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European and US banks with actively traded CDS over the period January 2004 to March 2013.3 For 
the purpose of our analysis, we selected only those banks with actively traded CDS and exclude those 
banks that trade too infrequently. Our sample covers over 90% of banks with traded CDS available in 
the CMA database and is composed of 55 large banks, headquartered in 15 countries.4 Our sample is 
therefore larger than those used in previous studies; for example Eichengreen et al. (2012) have a 
sample of 45 banks and Yang and Zhou (2013) of 43 banks as they include only the largest financial 
institutions in a smaller number of countries. Table 1 illustrates the sample banks, the available 
number of observations and the total assets value for each bank. More specifically, our sample is 
composed of 122,984 (unbalanced) panel observations for 2,407 days. 
Following Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Eichengreen et al. (2012), among others, we select 5-
year CDS quotes, since these contracts are generally considered the most liquid and constitute the 
majority of the entire CDS market. The CDS spread indicates the 5-year CDS premium mid expressed 
in basis points.  
The sample period covers almost a decade (2004 – 2013).5 This relatively long time period 
allows us to investigate a more stable period, the global financial crisis period and the European 
sovereign debt crisis period. Note that the indication of the reference period as "pre-crisis", "global 
financial crisis" and "eurozone debt crisis" is only an approximation for ease of discussion. We do not 
impose specific time periods, as the estimations are carried out on a rolling window framework.  
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
                                                 
3
 While daily data are subject to more noise compared to weekly and monthly data, there are also some 
advantages: daily data provide more observation points and, therefore enhances the estimation efficiency 
(Elyasiani et al., 2015). In addition, daily data better captures short-lived co-movements and spillover effects 
(Eun and Shim, 1989; Hamao et al., 1990; De Santis and Gerard, 1998). Mayordomo et al. (2014) conclude that 
among the six most widely used CDS data bases, CMA is the leading data source. 
4
 CDS trading activity is heterogeneous among market participants. Chen et al. (2011) present data on market 
composition and trading dynamics of global CDS transactions and report that trade frequency in single-name 
CDS was on average relatively low (less than once a day), with market activity dropping off quickly after the 
top set of traded names. Notably, the financial sector reference entities include the largest share of the actively 
traded CDS. For the empirical analysis, we exclude only those banks that trade too infrequently. 
5
 Although data on CDS spreads are available from January 2003, only a very small number of banks (around 
18% of the banks in the sample) traded in CDS during 2003; the majority of banks in our sample started to take 
part in CDS activities after 2004. Our sample covers over 90% of all banks trading CDS in the CMA database. 
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3.2 CDS Returns 
The main difficulty in constructing CDS returns is that there is no time series data on actual 
transaction prices for a specific default swap contract. To overcome this issue, we follow the intuitive 
framework proposed by Berndt and Obreja (2010) and use daily CDS spreads to calculate CDS 
returns, using a strategy that replicates the payoff of the contract. More specifically, we construct 
excess returns on a synthetic defaultable bond from CDS spreads’ data.6 This way of constructing the 
CDS returns entails that a positive (negative) change in the CDS spread implies a negative (positive) 
CDS return. One additional advantage of using CDS returns is that it allows us to obtain stationary 
returns series.  
 
4. Preliminary Analysis 
4.1 Pair-wise correlations 
The first step to understand contagion is to explore the pair-wise correlations between the CDS 
returns for the banks in the sample. As we are interested in the level of interconnectedness between 
markets, we classify banks in the sample according to their country of origin and build equally 
weighted portfolios of CDS returns to analyse their pair-wise correlations. To do this, we compute the 
daily country CDS return as the daily average CDS return of all the banks in a country. Country CDS 
return portfolios correlations are reported in Table 2.7 In general terms, we observe a high correlation 
level (0.40 on average) between banks CDS returns portfolios. We interpret it as a preliminary sign of 
contagion between bank credit markets. The portfolios that present higher than average correlation 
coefficients are the UK (0.53), the Netherlands (0.52), Italy (0.50), Germany (0.50), Switzerland 
(0.50), France (0.48) and Spain (0.46).  
 
                                                 
6
 This is a way of overcoming the fact that we cannot compute the return on a CDS initially as it is priced at 
zero, and because CDS spreads reflect the at-market spread of a new contract. See Appendix A for 
methodological details.  
7
 For ease of exposition, we do not present the pair-wise correlation 55x55 matrix among individual banks CDS. 
Note that our final objective is to analyze contagion between markets, not between banks. We have nevertheless 
estimated the pair-wise correlations at the bank level. The results (available upon request) show the expected 
high interconnectedness among banks within the same country.  
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<Insert Table 2 around here> 
 
The portfolio of UK banks exhibits the highest correlation with the Netherlands (0.81), 
followed by Germany (0.73), Italy (0.67) and France (0.66). The correlation between the Netherlands 
and Switzerland is also high (0.78). These results indicate links between banks inside and outside the 
euro area. Credit risk interconnectedness is high among euro area banks, for example the Netherlands 
presents a high correlation with Germany (0.70), Italy (0.68) and France (0.65). On the other hand, the 
portfolio composed of Greek banks displays the lowest correlation (on average) of the sample (0.10). 
Finally, the portfolio of US banks presents a correlation with some European countries (for example, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and UK), although the values are lower than expected.  
 
4.2 Principal Component Analysis 
The high pair-wise correlations summarized in Table 2 indicate high commonality, and thus are 
often considered a preliminary indicator of contagion. The next step in our analysis is to apply 
principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the common patterns underlying the correlations 
among the CDS returns of individual banks. In the first instance, PCA provides us with a measure of 
the cross-market co-movements around the sample period. If the PCA reveals a significant increase in 
co-movements, this can be considered a further indication that that contagion has occurred. 
In addition, PCA also allows us to decompose the individual bank CDS returns series in two 
non-observable components: a common and a residual component. This step allows us to decompose 
each bank's CDS returns into a systematic return, related to common factors, and an idiosyncratic 
component, that is the part of the CDS return that is not due to commonality. 
Let ! be the # × % CDS returns data matrix, where # is the sample size and % is the number of 
banks considered in the analysis. We project the data matrix on a &-dimensional plane of the form 
 ! = () ∙ +, + .                                                      (1) 
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where the columns of the % × & matrix W are & eigenvectors corresponding to the largest & 
eigenvalues of the correlation matrix !!′ #⁄ , the columns of the # × & matrix PC are the first & 
principal components, while the resulting innovations are gathered in the columns of the # × % matrix .. In addition to that, PCA provides us with a measure of the percentage of variance explained by 
each principal component, which is computed as the ratio between the d eigenvalues divided by the 
sum of all eigenvalues. A significant increase in this measure can be considered as an indicator of 
contagion. 
As discussed above, the use of the common factors on all banks, the matrix PC, also enables us 
to extract the residual component for each bank by using the following regression: 
 
 !5 = 65 + 75 ∙ () + 85, : = 1, … , %                                                     (2) 
 
This approach allows us to decompose each bank's CDS return into a systematic component (due to 
common factors that affect to all banks), 65 + 75 ∙ (), and a idiosyncratic component, 85, linked to the 
bank’s fundamentals. This way, we obtain the systematic and idiosyncratic CDS returns for each 
individual bank.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Figure 1 plots the time evolution of the proportion of variance explained by the first four 
principal components8 of bank CDS returns series.9 The analysis is performed over the entire sample 
period, using 200-day rolling windows. It shows that the contribution of common factors to the total 
variation in CDS returns changes considerably throughout the sample period. Before mid-2007, it 
                                                 
8
 The fifth principal component individually explains very little, between 2.5% and 4.8% of the variance through 
the rolling windows. By looking at the eigenvalues, we could potentially choose a higher number of principal 
components, which have a value higher than one. However, as the values of subsequent components are very 
close to one, we base the rolling PCA on the first four principal components. The full set of results is not shown, 
but these are available upon request. 
9
 In order to check the potential presence of serial correlation in bank CDS returns correlation matrix we have 
filtered for autocorrelation. The results are robust and available upon request. 
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varied between 10% and 40% (with an increasing trend over time). On average, in stable periods, 
bank CDS returns exhibit a limited amount of co-movement. The first four factors explain on average 
the 33% of the total variance of the returns, thus suggesting that during stable periods banks’ credit 
risk is mainly linked to fundamentals and not driven by global macroeconomic factors. 
The picture changes after the onset of the sub-prime crisis in July 2007. The co-movements in 
CDS returns increase significantly, fluctuating between 40% and 70%. After July 2007, the 
contribution of the first four components doubled and the percentage of total variance explained by 
the four components became, on average the 44%, 50%, 56% and 60% respectively. These results 
indicate that common factors play an important role in bank CDS markets during periods of financial 
distress. It is possible to identify significant events in financial markets’ recent years and observe the 
corresponding increase in co-movement in CDS returns.  
The importance of common factors increased to extraordinary levels between the outbreak of 
the subprime crisis and the rescue of Bear Stearns, possibly reflecting markets’ perceptions of 
increased credit risk. In the period between January 2007 and March 2008, the portion of variance 
explained by the first four components jumped from 30% to 63%. During this period we observe three 
main peaks: the first one in early August 2007, when co-movement increased quickly (up to 58%).10 
The second peak is in January 200811, when co-movement increased to 62%; the third peak in March 
2008 (at the time of the Bear Stearns troubles) when co-movement in CDS returns increased to 64%. 
Following the Bearn Stearns episode, the percentage of variance explained by common components 
remained high, at 50-60%. The increase in co-movement became even more evident after Lehman 
Brothers' failure in September 2008. Further increases in co-movement were related to episodes of the 
eurozone crisis. For example, in May 2010, at the time of the first Greek bailout, we observe the 
highest share of explained variance accounted by principal components: it reached 73%, and remained 
very high until February 2011. On October 27, 2011, we can see a peak of 61%, at the time of the 
second Greek bailout. A peak of 61% was then reached on May 16, 2012, amid speculations of a 
                                                 
10
 In August 2007, some of the largest equity hedge funds started to report unprecedented losses. See Table B.1 
in Appendix B for a timeline of key events. 
11
 Specifically, this peak was on January 25, 2008, January 25, 2008, one day after the announcement of the 
largest drop in 25 years of US home sales and the first house price decrease in several years. 
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Greek exit from the eurozone. Table B.1 in the Appendix B reports a timeline of key events during the 
global financial and eurozone crises.   
In summary, the results of the PCA indicate that there is a significant amount of commonality 
in CDS returns across all the 55 banks, which can be interpreted as an indicator of contagion 
occurring over the sample period. These results are consistent with the idea that during periods of 
international financial crises, correlations between assets and markets are higher and this is often a 
key element in the underestimation of risk in stress periods.  
To understand the sources of commonality, we examine the weight vector associated with each 
principal component. To do so, and taking into the account the difficulty of looking at the PCs of each 
rolling window, we first consider the findings obtained for the whole sample period. In the first PC, 
the highest factor loadings are positive and associated with large European banks (by total assets). We 
interpret this component as a value-weighted market portfolio of European banks. In the second PC 
the highest factor loadings are negative and associated with US banks. This component can be 
interpreted as an area component that distinguishes European banks (with positive weights), and US 
banks (with negative weights). In the third PC, Scandinavian banks are identified, with positive and 
large weights. These are banks with low CDS spreads. Finally, the fourth component is related to mid-
sized banks in Europe. These are mainly banks from euro-peripheral countries, with positive weights 
and high CDS spread levels, on average. Hence, we can interpret this fourth PC component as banks 
from countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis.   
In addition, we also analyse the findings over time. While the results are generally in line with 
those reported above, when we consider the period January 2004 to July 2007, only the first two PC 
are important and they can be interpreted as above. During the global financial crisis (July 2007 to 
September 2009), the second PC captures the differences between banks inside and outside the 
eurozone, while US banks are gathered in the third PC. Finally, in the last period (October 2009 to 
March 2013), the second PC is again related to the US area, while the third PC isolates the difficulties 
that Greek banks were experiencing, in contrast to the good performance of US financial institutions. 
 
4.3 Building CDS Portfolios 
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The use of portfolios provides an efficient way to summarize all the information included in 
individual bank CDS returns, with the advantage of smoothing the noise in the data, mainly due to 
transitory shocks in individual institutions. The examination of the weight vectors associated with 
each principal component has indicated differences between banks in the US, in Europe and within 
the eurozone. We build upon these results and distinguish between banks headquartered in the so-
called GIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), other countries in the eurozone, European 
countries outside the eurozone and the US.12  
Based on this allocation, we build four equally weighted portfolios, using average CDS data for 
each bank headquartered in a country within a specific geographical area. The first portfolio consists 
of banks headquartered in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS countries); we define this portfolio 
as euro-peripheral. The second portfolio consists of banks headquartered in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands; we label this portfolio as euro-core. The third portfolio comprises 
banks from European countries but outside the eurozone (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK); we label this portfolio non-euro. Finally, our fourth portfolio consists of US banks 
(simply labelled as US).  
The CDS portfolios are computed following a two-step procedure. First, average CDS data are 
calculated at the country level. The estimation of the average of CDSs for all available banks in a 
country allows us to circumvent the problem of unbalanced portfolios. Next, portfolios CDS data are 
calculated as the average CDS data for the countries within a specific portfolio. This allows us to 
obtain CDS portfolios that reflect the average bank credit risk in a specific portfolio.  
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
                                                 
12
 Although not an official definition, the distinction between core (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Finland and France) and periphery (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) within the eurozone has 
become established in the academic and policy literature since the onset of the eurozone crisis. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the daily time evolution of CDS spreads and returns series for the four 
portfolios; descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.13 Prior to July 2007, CDS spreads were 
relatively stable, at around 16 bps (and this is fairly homogeneous). By July 2007, the extent of the 
subprime mortgage crisis was becoming apparent; with a sharp increase in mortgage delinquencies 
and a subsequent decrease in house prices. It can be easily seen that from July 2007 CDS spread 
started to increase dramatically, both in level and volatility, mainly for US banks. October 2009, on 
the other hand, is considered the beginning of the eurozone crisis, although signs of instability 
appeared much earlier. In March 2009 CDS spreads peaked at over 216 bps for euro-peripheral 
countries' banks; at 274 bps for euro-core; at 228 bps for non-euro and 338 bps for US banks 
respectively. Note that all the banks in the sample experienced positive CDS returns (on average) 
during the pre-crisis period, whereas throughout the global financial crisis returns became negative on 
average. This may suggest that during periods of instability CDS spreads are not fully explained by 
banks' credit risk (default component), but are also driven by the overall market situation (common 
global component). For US banks, negative average CDS returns were around 50% lower than CDS 
returns for European banks. Outside the US, countries whose banks were the most affected by the 
global financial crisis were Belgium, Greece and Spain. With hindsight, this can be seen as a prelude 
to the trouble their banks faced in more recent times. 
In the months following the peak of the sub-prime crisis, the level of CDS spreads for US and 
European banks began to fall, but it remained higher then in the pre-crisis period. In 2009, substantial 
differences between US and European banks started to emerge. US banks’ CDS spreads peaked in 
March 2009, at over 338 bps. The trend then reverted, with US banks’ CDS spreads reaching a 
minimum in December 2009 and remaining stable thereafter. Indeed, in the period 2009-2013, US 
banks’ CDS spreads stabilised at values below those seen previously but higher than pre-crisis period 
values. In Europe, however, the recovery phase was short-lived; bank CDS spreads increased 
                                                 
13
 The division of the sample into three sub-periods is an approximation for ease of discussion. Since both CDS 
spreads’ evolution (Figure 2) and the PCA analysis indicate significant differences around these dates, it is 
convenient to discuss the sub-periods when analysing the summary statistics. Note however, this has no 
implication for the study of contagion in the next step, as the estimations are carried out on a 200-day rolling 
window.        
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gradually during the last quarter of 2009 and displayed record peaks in November 2011 and then 
again in May 2012, mainly following the Greek crisis and speculations of a Greek exit from the 
eurozone. It is during this period that the differences between US and European banks CDS spreads 
became more evident, thus indicating that, while European banks were badly affected by the sub-
prime crisis, US banks were relatively immune to eurozone banks' troubles. Indeed, US banks are the 
only banks with positive average CDS returns during the most recent part of our sample period. 
From October 2009, differences also become apparent among European banks’ portfolios. 
Specifically, banks from euro-peripheral countries exhibit larger increase in CDS spreads, driven 
mainly by Greek banks (up to a peak of 4,191 bps), Portuguese banks (with a peak of 1,484 bps) and, 
to a lesser degree, Spanish (peak 770 bps), Belgian (peak 709 bps) and Italian banks (peak 695 bps). 
These exceptionally high values are evidently linked to the sovereign debt crisis.14 In contrast, CDS 
spreads for German and UK banks remained stable during the same time period. In addition, banks 
from countries outside the eurozone showed, on average, lower levels and volatility compared to the 
CDS spread curve for their eurozone counterparts. 
 
5. GVAR methodology 
Having established high co-movement in bank CDS returns, the next step is to evaluate if 
contagion occurred. We estimate return spillover effects following the Generalized Vector 
Autoregressive framework (GVAR) methodology developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009; 2012), 
which is a VAR-based spillover index particularly suited for the investigation of systems of highly 
interdependent variables. The methodology not only allows for the identification of the directional 
lead-lag effects between two variables (spillover effect), but also allows us to determine which effect 
dominates in a bivariate or multiple effects situation (net indices). This allows for the identification of 
net transmitters and receivers of spillovers. In addition, GVAR assigns a numerical value (between 0 
and 100 in the case of the total index; and between -100 and 100 in the case of net indices) to the 
spillovers across portfolios, thus providing measures that indicate the degree of interaction between 
                                                 
14
 A detailed discussion of the events that might have caused the peaks is outside the remit of this paper. 
Appendix B, Table B.1 offers a timeline of the key events of the crises.  
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the variables. Finally, the estimations can be carried out in a rolling window framework, therefore 
allowing for the analysis of spillover effects over time. Given the prolonged period of turbulence in 
international banking markets, this enables us to understand better the dynamics of international risk 
transmission. 
Spillovers are measured from a particular variance decomposition associated with an N-variable 
vector autoregression framework, which allow us to parse the forecast error variances of each variable 
into parts, which are attributable to the various system shocks. The main advantage of this approach is 
that it eliminates the possible dependence of the empirical results on the ordering of the variables, in 
contrast to the traditional Cholesky factorization.15  
More specifically, this approach consists of two steps. First, we consider a covariance 
stationary N-variable VAR(p) 
 >? = ∑ !5"5#$ >?%5 + 8?                                               (3)  
 
where ε~(0, Σ+ is a vector of independently and identically distributed disturbances and >? denotes a N-variable vector of CDS returns. In particular, since the analysis is performed twice, >? will be first 
the systematic and second the idiosyncratic CDS returns of the four portfolios previously built.  
Next, we calculate the specific variance decompositions of the GVAR methodology. To do so 
we first rewrite the VAR(p) model as a moving average representation >? = ∑ ,58?%5-5#. , where the / × / coefficient matrices are estimated by ,5 = !$,5%$ + !0,5%0 + ⋯ + !",5%", with ,. being 
the identity matrix and ,5 = 0 for : < 0.16 Now, the variance shares defined as the fractions of the H-
step-ahead error variances in forecasting >5 that are due to shocks to >3, 4 = 1,2, …, are given by 
 
                                                 
15
 It is a well-known that traditional variance decomposition schemes associated with a VAR based on Cholesky 
factorization suffer from the problem that results are dependent on the ordering of the variables. Following the 
GVAR approach, this problem is circumvented by exploiting the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. 
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), among others. 
16
 For a detailed explanation of the VAR methodology see Lütkepohl (1990) and Lütkepohl (2005).  
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63→58 (4+ = 9::;< ∑ =>?@AB>:CDE;<BFG∑ =>?@ABHAB@ >?CE;<BFG , for :, L = 1,2, … , /                    (4) 
 
where H can only take finite values,  M33  is the standard deviation of the error term for the jth equation, 
i.e. the squared root of the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix Σ and N5 is the vector 
with one as the ith element and zeros otherwise. This particular generalized variance decomposition 
eliminates the dependence of the spillover effects on the ordering of the variables. Nevertheless, as the 
shocks to each variable are not orthogonalized, the row sum of the variance decomposition is not 
equal to 1. Thus, each entry of the variance decomposition matrix can be normalized by the row sum 
as 
 
6O3→58 (4+ = P:→?Q (R+∑ P:→?Q (R+S:F< × 100, for :, L = 1,2, … , /                   (5) 
 
where the multiplication by 100 is just to have it in percentage terms. Note that, by construction ∑ 6O3→58 (4+T3#$ = 100 and ∑ 6O3→58 (4+T5,3#$ = / × 100.  
In this framework, each element of the normalized decomposition matrix shows the degree (the 
percentage) of variation in CDS returns of portfolio i that is due to shocks (innovations) in CDS 
returns of portfolio j. This indicator is our measure of contagion; it captures the return spillover effect 
to portfolio i’s deriving from unexpected shocks in portfolio j’s. It takes higher values as the intensity 
of the contagion effect increases. In the case of no spillovers from one series to the other, the indicator 
is equal to zero.  
Using the above normalized variance contributions, we can then construct some additional 
spillover measures, which indicate the degree of interaction between the variables. The total return 
spillover index measures the contribution of spillovers of return shocks across all N series to the total 
forecast error variance and is given by:  
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#U8 (4+ = ∑ PV:→?Q (R+S?,:F<?W: T                                               (6) 
 
It indicates on average the percentage of the forecast error variance in all the series that comes 
from spillovers (from contagion due to shocks). In other words, it captures the average level of cross-
market spillovers.  
The GVAR approach enables us also to evaluate the direction of the spillover effects, which is 
crucial in a spillover analysis. The net directional return spillover indices measure the spillover 
transmitted by portfolio i to all others  
 /XU5→YZZ8 (4+ = ∑ 6O5→38 (4+T3#$5[3 − ∑ 6O3→58 (4+, for : = 1,2, … , /T3#$3[5                 (7) 
 
This is the difference between the spillover effects transmitted by portfolio i to all other 
portfolios and those received by i from all other portfolios. In other words, when multiple spillover 
effects are found among the portfolios, we are able to determine which portfolio leads as transmitter 
(receiver) of contagion to (from) all the others. If the spillover transmitted from i is higher (lower) 
than the spillover received by i, the index NDS will be positive (negative), and thus portfolio i can be 
seen as a transmitter (receiver) of contagion to (from) all other. 
Similarly, the GVAR enables us to identify the transmitter or receiver of contagion between 
each pair of portfolios. The net pairwise return spillover indices between series i and j are defined as 
 /(U5→38 (4+ = 6O5→38 (4+ − 6O3→58 (4+, for :, L = 1,2, … , /                 (8) 
 
This is the difference between spillover effects transmitted from i to j and those transmitted 
from j to i. Hence, it is positive (negative) when the impact of i’s shocks is higher (lower) than vice 
versa, indicating that portfolio i is net transmitter (receiver) of contagion to (from) portfolio j. 
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6. Empirical results    
We generate GVAR spillover measures using 200-day rolling samples and assess the variation 
over time via the corresponding time series of spillover indices. The model is estimated twice, once 
for the systematic and once for the idiosyncratic CDS returns of the four portfolios built previously 
(euro-peripheral; euro-core; non-euro and US). This yields estimates of systematic and idiosyncratic 
contagion. Systematic contagion indicates the presence of spillovers among the portfolios of 
systematic CDS returns while idiosyncratic contagion indicates the presence of spillovers among the 
portfolios of idiosyncratic CDS returns. In this context, our measure of systematic contagion captures 
the spillover effects due to changes in global factors that affects all banks’ credit risk whereas 
idiosyncratic contagion measures the spillover effects caused by changes in bank-specific factors.  
At each window, the lag p of the GVAR model is determined using the likelihood ratio test, 
which confirms that p varies over time.17 To choose the forecast horizon of ten days (4 = 10) we 
compute at each window the total return spillover index for 4 varying from 1 to 16. The results show 
that the index is sensitive to the choice of the forecast horizon for low values of 4, but in general it is 
stabilized for 4 = 10. This is the forecasting horizon commonly used in similar studies (see for 
example Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). 
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Figures 3 to 5 illustrate the evolution over time of the different return spillover measures, 
corresponding to the total return spillover index of systematic contagion (TSI-SC - in black in the 
Figures) and to the total return spillover index of idiosyncratic contagion (TSI-IC - in grey in the 
Figures). This part of the analysis aims to measure the cross-border spillovers in banking markets. 
The time dependent TSI-SC illustrated in Figure 3 reveals high levels of contagion across 
markets, especially after the onset of the global financial crisis on July 2007. Prior to the credit 
crunch, the TSI-SC was around 44%, while the TSI-IC was only around 10%. 
                                                 
17
 The Akaike information criterion does lead in some cases to higher values, but this criterion tends to 
overestimate the number of lags.  
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In July 2007, with the onset of the sub-prime crisis, systematic contagion started to increase: it 
climbed from 44% to 74% in the following months (the maximum of the TSI-SC throughout the 
whole sample period) and it remained at around 60% for the rest of the sample period. This indicates a 
high level of interconnectedness across bank CDS markets, due to global factors affecting all banks. 
Idiosyncratic contagion also increased (to 17%) in July 2007, but the peak only lasted a few days and 
then it decreased to previous levels. As the sub-prime crisis turned into the global financial crisis, we 
find strong evidence of systematic contagion across banking markets. During the global financial 
crisis period, the idiosyncratic contagion index remains rather low, although it does respond to some 
key events: for example, it increases in September 2008 (up to 30%) when Merrill Lynch was sold to 
Bank of America and Lehman Brothers collapsed.  
During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis (2009-2013) idiosyncratic contagion became more 
pronounced, increasing from 10% to 21% on average. Although the TSI-SC remained high (60%), it 
was slightly lower than in the previous sub-period. At the height of the Greek crisis, the TSI-IC 
increased to 35%, but the systematic component still played an important role of (it reached its third 
peak during our sample period, at 67%). During the second half of 2011, the increasing concerns 
about the worsening of public finances in several eurozone countries, together with the perspective of 
a Greek exit from the euro area, heightened financial market tensions. This lead to increased fragility 
of many eurozone banks (Greek, Italian and Spanish banks in particular) and was reflected in an 
increase in the idiosyncratic component of 40% (the biggest increase over the whole sample period).  
The policy measures implemented by the ECB in October 2011 and February 2012 appeared to 
have had a positive impact, as they seemed to result into a more benign financial market sentiment in 
the first half of 2012.18 The TSI-SC remained high, fluctuating at around 60%, however, the 
idiosyncratic component declined significantly after December 2011. Finally, a significant increase in 
the idiosyncratic spillover index occurred in the period September-December 2012 (over 20%). One 
possible explanation is that markets worried about the fate of Spanish banks, as Spain’s cost of 
borrowing increased dramatically. 
                                                 
18
 The ECB decided to conduct refinancing operations that significantly extended the horizon at which credit 
institutions could obtain liquidity from the Eurosystem (for more details see Appendix B). 
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To summarize, the total return spillover indices vary substantially over time, with higher values 
during periods of market turbulence. Of the two indices, the total return spillover index of systematic 
contagion (TSI-SC) is higher than the idiosyncratic total return spillover index (TSI-IC) over the 
entire sample period, indicating that contagion in banking market is mainly driven by shocks to 
common factors affecting all banks. However, we have identified a few instances where idiosyncratic 
shocks have cause spillovers in other banking markets. These seem to be linked to episodes of bank 
failure (for example, the Lehman Brothers’ in September 2008) or increased probability of bank 
failure, for example in the case of Spanish banks during the last two quarters of 2011. 
 
6.1 Net Directional Spillovers and Net Pairwise Return Spillovers 
The next step of the analysis is to account for directional information. To this end, we compute 
the net directional return spillover index, which will enable us to identify the net transmitters and 
receivers of contagion. The results are illustrated in Figure 4. In addition we compute the net pairwise 
return spillovers effects between two portfolios and consider the time evolution of the pair-wise 
relationships: these are summarized in the three sub-periods as above: January 2004 – June 2007; July 
2007 – September 2009; October 2009 – March 2013, as shown in Figure 5.19 
 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
 
Looking at Figures 4 and 5, we can see that during the first part of the sample period (January 
2004 – July 2007) both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion are present in all portfolios, which 
indicates that all banks in all countries/portfolios were both at the giving and receiving ends of the net 
transmissions, with similar magnitudes. The picture changes during the crises period. 
                                                 
19
 To summarize the main results, Figure 5 shows only the overall net pairwise return spillovers relationships. 
The division into the three sub-periods is an approximation for ease of discussion as the GVAR estimations are 
carried out on a rolling window framework. Graphs relating to the time evolution of net pairwise return indices 
are not presented to conserve space but are available upon request. 
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Banks in the US remained positive, in net systematic terms, during the global financial crisis 
(2007-2009). In July 2007, the net directional return systematic spillovers from US banks were as 
high as 90% and were mostly transmitted to banks located in euro-core (45%) and to a lesser extent to 
banks in euro-peripheral countries (25%) and to banks in non-euro countries (18%). During this 
period, euro-core countries were the main net systematic receivers of instability, not only from the 
US, but also from euro-peripheral (15%) and non-euro (18%). After this extraordinary impact, 
systematic contagion declined significantly. The Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers episodes 
impacted systematically (both around 10%) in all other zones. In summary, US banks were a natural 
net systematic return spillover transmitter during the global financial crisis, while banks in the three 
other markets/portfolios were net systematic return spillover receivers.  
Consistently with the results presented for the total spillover indices, during the financial crisis 
period we find a limited amount of idiosyncratic contagion. There were some isolated significant 
events, linked to specific domestic episodes in some European banks. In general, net spillover 
measures were lower and their impact was more pronounced a year later than systematic contagion. In 
particular, after Lehman Brothers’ default (September 2008) until the end of 2009, banks in euro-
peripheral countries became net idiosyncratic transmitters to the other European portfolios (18% to 
euro-core and 10% to non-euro). In addition, euro-core banks not only received idiosyncratic 
contagion from banks in the euro-peripheral portfolio, but also from the non-euro portfolio, with an 
impact of 13% in September 2008. 
Moving on to the period of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, banks in the euro-peripheral 
portfolio were the net idiosyncratic transmitters (to all other portfolios), particularly from May 2010 
(following the first Greek bailout) and with a bigger impact during the second half of 2011. However, 
the impact of the Greek bailout seems to be stronger for banks in non-euro countries, while banks in 
euro-core countries were less affected. Similarly, banks in the US are barely responding to eurozone 
banks’ troubles. During this period, banks in euro-core countries we the net systematic transmitters, 
with the spillovers mostly affecting banks in euro-peripheral countries. During 2013, euro-peripheral 
banks were receivers of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion, from euro-core and non-euro 
banks. Finally, the Cyprus debt crisis on March 19, 2013 caused a significant increase in both 
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spillover indices. Following this episode, the indices decreased again, signaling that the immediate 
risk of a eurozone breakup seemed to have been averted and confidence was slowly recovering.  
This part of the analysis illustrates the importance of evaluating the time-varying dimension of 
risk spillovers as well as the main sources of contagion. The identification of net transmitters and 
receivers of contagion allows us to build a clear picture of the channels through which contagion 
occurred. The fact that the systematic component dominates in all the analysis indicates the increased 
interconnection of global banking markets. International banks are exposed to common shocks 
through holdings of foreign-issued financial instruments and through foreign lending exposures. 
Indeed, most large banks had substantial holdings of US-issued financial instruments (particularly 
asset backed and mortgage backed securities), which contributed to the transmission of risk spillovers. 
On the other hand, US banks have relatively low holdings of foreign assets, both in terms of 
government securities and foreign lending, which can potentially explain why they did not appear to 
receive risk spillovers from European banks during the sovereign debt crisis period.  
 
7. Robustness tests 
7.1 A Comparison with Market Indices 
To understand whether our measure of systematic contagion captures the information 
included in the sovereign CDS spreads for the countries in our sample, we build an index that reflects 
the average of all sovereign CDS spreads in the sample. We then investigate the trend of this 
sovereign CDS index over time, focusing specifically around dates when our total return spillover 
index for systematic contagion (TSI-SC)  ‘peaked’. This additional analysis allows us to see that the 
TSI-SC does reflect changes in sovereign CDS, but also incorporates ‘other’ information. In assessing 
this comparison, it is necessary to bear in mind that the sovereign CDS spreads indicate an increase in 
the perceived risk of a country, whereas our measure indicates how this increased risk affects the CDS 
spreads of other countries. Figure 6 (Panel A, B, C, D and E), illustrates the time evolution of our 
sovereign CDS index at particular points in time over the sample period. In the second half of 2007, 
our TSI-SC rose from 44% to 74% indicating an increase in systematic contagion. We can see (Figure 
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6, Panel A) that prior to June 2007, the sovereign CDS index is stable at around 5bps, increasing 
significantly thereafter. Interestingly, the increase in the sovereign CDS index precedes of a month the 
increase in the TSI-SC (20 June 2007 for the CDS index and 30/07/2007 for TSI-SC) but does not 
reach the same levels. Following the peak in June 2007, the CDS index remains stable (although at 
higher values) till the end of 2007.  
From our main analysis, the TSI-SC increases to 70% in September 2008. The sovereign CDS 
index (Figure 6, Panel B) also increases substantially in September 2008, reaching a first peak of 75 
bps on October 24, 2008; a second peak of 120 bps on December 8, 2008; and a third of 150 bps on 
February 25, 2009. During this period, our TSI-SC and the sovereign CDS index reflect similar 
changes. 
The next peak in our TSI-SC index is in May 2010 (67%). Figure 6, Panel C, illustrates the 
trend in the average sovereign CDS index as defined above. At the beginning of May 2010 the index 
was at around 122 bps, with an increasing trend following the first Greek bailout and the downgrade 
in the rating of the Greek government bonds. It reached 178 bps on 7 May 2010 (an increase of 
45.90%). After this sharp increase, the sovereign CDS index fell to 104 bps on 12 May 2010, and then 
stabilised at high levels of around 150 bps. Again, the sovereign CDS index is consistent with the 
spillovers identified by the TSI-SC in May 2010. 
In March 2012 the sovereign CDS index (Figure 6, Panel D) rises sharply, as a consequence 
of the extremely high levels of Greece’s sovereign CDS spreads (37,030.49 bps). Our average index 
therefore reflects this rise, prior to the Greek government’s decision to discontinue the CDS market on 
8 March 2012. This increase is consistent with the trend in the TSI-SC, which also show increases in 
the first half on 2012. Finally, between July 2012 and March 2013, we observe a slight decrease in the 
level of systematic contagion that is reflected in a slight reduction in the level of sovereign CDS 
(Figure 6, Panel E) between September and December 2012. However, although the sovereign CDS 
index decreases, it remains at exceptionally high levels (over 120 bps). 
Next, we compare the results obtained in our main analysis concerning the total return 
spillover index for idiosyncratic contagion (TSI-IC). As, the TSI-IC reflects changes in CDS returns 
linked to bank fundamentals, we compare it to share prices returns for our portfolios. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, we build two stock returns portfolios for the Greek and 
Spanish banks in our sample to show the average stock returns (Greek Banks Stock Returns Index and 
Spanish Banks Stock Returns Index). Figure 6, Panel F, illustrates the stock returns for our portfolio 
of Greek banks in 2010, at around the time of the first Greek bailout. The negative stock returns seem 
consistent with an increase in the TSI-IC. Next we build a stock returns portfolio for the Spanish 
banks in our sample. Figure 6, Panel G, illustrates the stock returns for our portfolio of Spanish banks 
between July 2012 and March 2013, at the time of the increases in the TSI-IC documented in the main 
analysis. While negative returns seem broadly consistent with increases in the TSI-IC, idiosyncratic 
contagion does not fully reflect share prices returns. While the index reflects the deterioration of share 
prices of Greek and Spanish banks, it also captures the extent to which shocks in one bank spillover to 
other banks – this spillover effect is not fully incorporated in market prices. 
 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
7.2 Weighted portfolios 
As a robustness check, we repeat the analysis using weighted portfolios (by total assets). 
Weighted portfolios reflect the average credit risk for a specific area, giving greater weight to larger 
banks. The time evolution of the spillover indices derived from the use of weighted portfolios is in 
general similar to the ones obtained with equally weighted portfolios. However, it appears that the use 
of weighted portfolios overestimates the levels of contagion. Table 4, Panel A summarises the main 
differences with respect to the original analysis. Results show that the total return spillover index for 
systematic contagion in the pre-crisis period is higher than in the estimations carried out with equally 
weighted portfolios. The higher systematic contagion before 2007 is related to the greater spillovers 
that US banks receive from all the others, specifically after January 2006. The second main difference 
relates to idiosyncratic contagion; while the general trend is consistent with the previous estimations, 
it is about 10% higher during the whole sample period. In addition, it shows a peak of 37.46% in 
August 2007, remaining high for several months afterwards. This peak relates to the increment in the 
idiosyncratic contagion that euro-peripheral banks receive from non-euro and US banks. This 
spillover effect is absent with equally weighted portfolios.  
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<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
7.3 Excluding the US portfolio 
As a further robustness check, we repeat the analysis using only the portfolios of European 
banks (the euro-peripheral; euro-core and non-euro portfolios). On average, the exclusion of the US 
banks portfolio from the analysis does not lead to major differences, in terms of contagion, either 
systemic or idiosyncratic. However, there are certain differences that indicate the fundamental role of 
US banks in the transmission of risk spillovers. When we exclude the portfolio of US banks from the 
analysis, the contagion indices are always lower. In addition, around some key events, the exclusion 
of US banks leads us to underestimate contagion (see Table 4, Panel B for a summary of the key 
differences). 
For example, at the beginning of the subprime crisis in August of 2007 the systematic 
spillover is 58.64% (instead of 74.58%). Directional relations between European countries remain 
consistent with previous analysis; however the key information regarding US banks as causing the 
increase in systematic contagion is lost. In addition, during the months following the onset of the 
subprime crisis while systematic contagion remains high, the values are lower compared to the 
previous analysis (47.40% vs. 61.23%). More importantly, we note that during the eurozone crisis 
period, the exclusion of the US banks portfolio might lead to a misspecification of the results. This is 
because the analysis ignores an important part of the common risk factors (systematic ones) affecting 
all banks. Therefore, the idiosyncratic returns (that is the portion of returns after the common part is 
removed), not only collect the changes due to changes in the banks fundamentals, but they also have a 
large part of common contagion (the one relative to the US) contaminating the results. This is 
particularly important in the latter part of the sample period, where the idiosyncratic component is 
more important. For example, at the time of the first Greek bailout (May 2010), the idiosyncratic 
contagion index is only of 7.45% compared to the 35.01% obtained from the estimations that included 
the US portfolio. Similarly, during the second half of 2011 the peak values are around 20% compared 
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to values over 40% obtained in the original analysis. Directional relations between the different 
portfolios remain consistent, but their magnitude is diminished.  
 
8. Contagion within the euro-peripheral portfolio 
Given the severity of the eurozone crisis and the potential effect of contagion, particularly 
within the eurozone periphery or GIPS countries, we carry out an additional analysis estimating 
systematic and idiosyncratic contagion among the countries that belong to euro-peripheral portfolio. 
One of the key concerns of regulators and policymakers during the first Greek debts crisis was 
the potential spillover to banks in Spain, Portugal and Italy.20 This part of the analysis therefore aims 
to analyse the effect of the Greek crisis during the period 2009 to 2013 and its spillovers on Italian, 
Spanish and Portuguese banks. We build four equally weighted portfolios using average CDS data for 
each bank headquartered in a euro-peripheral country. Similarly to our prior analysis, the estimation 
of the average of CDS returns for all available banks in a country allows us to circumvent the problem 
of unbalanced portfolios. This allows us to obtain CDS portfolios that reflect the average bank credit 
risk in a specific country/portfolio.  
As before, we generate GVAR spillover measures using 200-day rolling samples and assess the 
variation over time via the corresponding time series of spillover indices. The model is estimated 
twice, once for the systematic and once for idiosyncratic CDS returns of the four countries/portfolios. 
In the discussion of the results we refer to Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy as the portfolios including 
Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian banks. 
<Insert Figure 7 here> 
Figures 7 to 9 present the time evolution of the different return spillover measures between 
2009 and 2013. The total systematic contagion between euro-peripheral countries is rather high during 
the whole sample period (50.37% on average) and increasing during 2010, at the height of the 
sovereign debt troubles. These results confirm a high level of interconnectedness across bank CDS 
markets of euro-peripheral countries, mainly due to common factors affecting all banks (particularly 
                                                 
20
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension to the analysis. 
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in 2010). We observe a peak of 72.53% in May 10, 2010 just 2 days after the second Greek bailout 
was approved, which indicates that contagion affected systematically all euro-peripheral banks. In the 
months following this event, the systematic contagion index remained high, at around 61.70% on 
average.  
 
<Insert Figure 8 here> 
<Insert Figure 9 here> 
 
However, the most interesting results are concerning the net indices, which show Greek banks 
as being net receivers of systematic contagion (11.77% on average) from all other portfolios. This 
effect is particularly pronounced in the period prior to July 2011, at the time of the second EU rescue 
package. At this time, Greece received net systematic contagion equal to 23.02%, of which 8.93% 
from Italy; 5.01% from Portugal and 9.07% Spain. 
Consistently with the previous analysis, the total idiosyncratic contagion index displays lower 
values compared to the systematic index: the average for whole sample is 33.98%. It is possible, 
however, to identify three distinct phases with high levels of idiosyncratic contagion: during 2010 an 
average value of 38.22%, with a peak of 50.66% in April 2010. This corresponds to the Greek 
government request of an initial loan of €45bn from the EU and IMF. The second period is mid-2011, 
with an average value of value of 41.72% and finally at the end of 2012, with an average value of 
41.48%.  
As with the systematic component, the most significant results are the ones related with the 
net indices, which indicate that Greek banks are also receivers of idiosyncratic contagion from all 
other banks (5.47% on average). This effect was especially high prior to January 2011, with Greece 
receiving 8.95% of idiosyncratic contagion (mostly from Spain at 5.95%). We can identify Spain as a 
net transmitter of idiosyncratic contagion in the period June 2011 to January 2012. Spanish banks 
transmit 20.47% of idiosyncratic spillovers to all others, with values of 6.7%, 8.1% and 5.5% to 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, respectively.  
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To sum up, the most surprising result is the role of Greek banks as net receivers of contagion, 
both systematic and idiosyncratic. This seems to indicate that the difficulties experienced by Greek 
banks did not spillover to other euro-peripheral banks whereas troubles elsewhere in the euro-
periphery affected Greek banks and added to their woes.  
9. Conclusion 
This paper provides an evaluation of contagion among banks and banking sectors in different 
countries and regions during a period of prolonged financial distress. Increased integration in global 
financial markets strengthened the linkages between banks in different countries. This increased 
interdependence ultimately resulted in the sub-prime crisis - a problem in a sector of the US financial 
market - becoming a global financial crisis. Despite a growing literature, the transmission mechanisms 
of contagion are still not fully understood. Banks are likely to remain vulnerable to episodes of 
instability and continued stress in the markets. 
We find supporting evidence of contagion in banking markets, firstly indicated by an increase 
in co-movement in CDS returns. This marked increase in commonality should be considered an early 
warning, alerting authorities to intervene. Contagion came in different waves, from July 2007 
onwards, with the financial and eurozone crises being distinct episodes. Indeed, while during the 
financial crisis contagion was systematic in nature, during the eurozone crisis the idiosyncratic part 
played an increasing role. The examination of net directional return spillover measures enabled us to 
identify group of banks in countries that can be seen as net transmitters and receivers of contagion. 
US banks appear to be net transmitters during the 2007-2009 period. During the eurozone crisis, 
banks in euro-peripheral countries were net transmitters in terms of idiosyncratic spillovers although 
eurozone troubles barely affected US banks. Differences in vulnerability to contagion within the 
Europe and even within the eurozone are remarkable, with the eurozone periphery more exposed to 
systematic contagion. The analysis of contagion within the euro-periphery portfolio confirms high 
levels of the systematic contagion index. Greek banks are net receivers of both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk spillovers, particularly from Spanish banks. 
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Taken together these findings seems to indicate that international linkages among banking 
markets are important for the transmission of shocks – as the systematic component of the total 
spillover index is always greater than the idiosyncratic component. However, there are some instances 
in the recent eurozone crisis where idiosyncratic shocks have cause spillovers in other banking 
markets. This seems to be linked to episodes of bank failure (for example, the Lehman Brothers’ 
failure in September 2008) or increased risk of bank failure as in the case of Spanish banks during the 
last two quarters of 2011. 
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Appendix A. Estimation of banks’ CDS returns 
CDS returns are computed following Berndt and Obreja (2010). The authors assert that 
returns on CDS reward for the exposure to the company’s default risk and compute CDS returns 
considering a portfolio that combines a long position in a T-year par defaultable bond issued by firm i 
and a short position in a T-year par riskless bond. This way, the computed return can be thought of as 
the excess return on a synthetic defaultable bond created by being long in a par-valued riskless bond 
and short the CDS on the same notional. 
Therefore, the daily CDS return is given by 
 ]^ _`,? = −∆)XU?(#+ × ,?(#+ = −∆)XU?(#+ $b ∑ c de, 3bf g de, 3bfbh3#$            (A.1) 
 
where ∆)XU?(#+ is the daily change in the CDS spreads with # maturity and ,?(#+ is the value of a 
defaultable quarterly annuity over the next # years. We denote the risk-free discount factor for day t 
and s years out as c(e, i+ and it is fitted from Datastream Euro and US zero curves. Assuming a 
constant risk-neutral default intensity λ for each bank, the risk-neutral survival probability of the bank 
over the next s years can be written as g(e, i+ = N%j(?%k+. As a consequence, λ can be computed 
directly from observed CDS spreads by l = 4nop d1 + ^_`bq f, which can be used to calculate the 
annuity and hence the CDS return. L denotes the risk-neutral expected fraction of notional lost in the 
event of default. It is fixed at 60%. 
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Appendix B. A timeline of the crises with selected key events 
Table B.1 
Calendar of key events  
This table shows a chronology of selected key events occurred during the recent global financial crisis and the 
eurozone debt crisis. 
 
Date Key Events 
July 18, 2007 Bear Stearns discloses that High-Grade Structured Credit and Enhanced Leveraged 
Funds had lost nearly all of their value amid a rapid decline in the market for subprime 
mortgages. 
July 19, 2007 Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA) closes above 14,000 for the first time in its 
history. 
July 26, 2007 Wall Street lost 2.26%, the London Stock Exchange, 3.15%, the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, 2.39%, the Paris Bourse 2.78%. 
August 7, 2007 Numerous quantitative long/short equity hedge funds began experiencing 
unprecedented losses as a result of liquidations by some managers eager to access cash 
during the liquidity crisis. This is often considered the starting date of the worldwide 
"credit crunch". 
August 9, 2007 French investment bank BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds that invested in 
subprime mortgage debt, due to a "complete evaporation of liquidity” in the market. 
This announcement compels the intervention of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
pumping €95bn into the European banking market. 
August 10, 2007 Central banks coordinate efforts to increase liquidity for first time since the aftermath of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Federal Reserve (FED) injects a combined 
$43bn, the ECB $214.6bn, and the Bank of Japan $8.4bn.  
August 16, 2007 Countrywide Financial Corporation, the biggest US mortgage lender, narrowly avoids 
bankruptcy by taking out an emergency loan of $11bn from a group of banks. 
August 17, 2007 The FED cuts the discount rate from 6.25% to 5.75%, in an attempt to stabilize 
financial markets. 
January 24, 2008 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) announces the largest drop in home sales 
in 25 years, and the first price decline in many years.  
March 10, 2008 DJIA at the lowest level since October 2006, falling more than 20% from its peak just 
five months prior. 
March 16, 2008 Bear Stearns is acquired by JP Morgan, in a deal supported by the FED. 
September 7, 2008 The FED takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, effectively nationalizing them.  
September 15, 2008 Merrill Lynch is sold to Bank of America amidst fears of a liquidity crisis and Lehman 
Brothers collapse. 
September 17, 2008 FED lends $85bn to AIG to avoid bankruptcy. 
September 19, 2008 Paulson financial rescue plan ($700bn emergency bailout through the purchase of toxic 
assets) is unveiled after a volatile week in stock and debt markets. 
September 25, 2008 Washington Mutual is seized by the FDIC and its banking assets sold to JP Morgan. 
January 18, 2009 The Danish Parliament agrees to a financial package worth $17.6bn. This marks the 
beginning of the Eurozone debt crisis. 
February 27, 2009 The two-month period to the end of February 2009 is the worst start to a year in the 
history of the S&P 500 (-18.62%).  
March 2, 2009 DJIA drops more than 50% from its October 2007 peak.  
March 6, 2009 The Bank of England announces up to 150bn pounds of quantitative easing. 
March 9, 2009 DJIA falls to 6440, a percentage decline exceeding the one experienced during the 
Great Depression. 
June 22, 2009 The World Bank announces that the global production for 2009 would fall by 2.9%, the 
first decline since the second world war. 
April 21, 2010 The Greek government requests an initial loan of €45bn from the European Union (EU) 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF). A few days later Standard & Poor's cuts 
Greece's sovereign debt rating to BB+. Stock markets worldwide and the euro currency 
decline in response to the downgrade. The Eurozone crisis worsens. 
 
 37 
 
Table B.1 (continued) 
Calendar of key events of the crises 
 
Date Key Events 
May 2, 2010 The first Greek bailout (€110bn) by the ECB, the European Commission (EC) and the 
IMF is approved. Credit rating agencies downgrade Greek government bonds even 
lower. 
May 3, 2010 ECB announces it will accept all outstanding and new debt instruments issued or 
guaranteed by the Greek government as collateral, in order to maintain banks' liquidity. 
May 8, 2010 The IMF Board approved a €30bn Stand-by arrangement for Greece. 
July 21, 2011 
 
EU emergency measures continue a second rescue package is approved. Eurozone 
leaders extend Greek, Irish and Portuguese loan repayment periods. They also approves 
a new €109bn support package for the newly created European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). 
August 11, 2011 European supervisors in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain announced a ban on 
establishing or increasing short positions in financial institutions’ stocks. 
September 1, 2011 Spanish government bonds fall after nation sells debt. 
October 27, 2011 The Troika, a tripartite committee formed by the EC, the ECB and the IMF, offers 
Greece a second bailout loan worth €172.6bn, conditional on the implementation of 
further austerity measures and a debt restructure agreement. 
October 31, 2011 The Greek Prime Minister announced a referendum to be held on 4 December, 2011 to 
decide whether or not Greece was to accept the bailout conditions of the Troika. 
November 1, 2011 Fitch says Greek Referendum threatens European stability. 
November 3, 2011 The Greek Prime Minister decided to cancel the referendum, and a new government 
will be formed in Greece the following days. 
November 11, 2011 Italian Sovereign debt risk premium surged to record high levels. 
November 24, 2011 Fitch downgrades the sovereign of Portugal to BB+ 
November 25, 2011 Fitch downgrades the Portuguese Banks’ Issuer Default Rating (IDR). 
December 12, 2011 Moody’s says Euro Area sovereigns remain under pressure in absence of decisive 
initiatives.  
January 9, 2012 Belgian authorities publically announced the approved measures to correct the 
excessive government deficit. 
February 12, 2012 The Greek parliament approves the new austerity package.  
February 21, 2012 The Troika agrees to provide a second bailout package €172.6bn (€28bn from IMF and 
€144.6bn from EFSF). 
March 2012 The Greek government defaults on its debt, the largest government default in history. 
This counted as a "credit event" and holders of credit default swaps were paid 
accordingly. 
May 15, 2012 Speculations of a Greek exit from the Eurozone increase. This phase becomes known as 
"Grexit" and influences market behaviour.  
June 9, 2012 Spain's 10-year bonds reaches 7% and the country face difficulties in accessing bond 
markets. The Eurozone crisis worsens. 
June 25, 2012 The Cypriot Government requests a bailout from the EFSF/ESM (European Stability 
Mechanism), citing difficulties in supporting its banking sector.  
September 2012 The ECB removes some of the pressure on Spain by announcing an "unlimited bond-
buying plan", conditional upon Spain signing a new sovereign bailout package with 
EFSF/ESM. 
November 28, 2012 Spain's €100bn support package earmarked for recapitalisation of the financial sector. 
The first ESM recapitalisation tranche of €39.47bn approved and transferred to the bank 
recapitalisation fund (FROB) on 11 December 2012. A second tranche of €1.86n was 
approved by the EC on 20 December with the aim to recapitalise "category 2" banks 
and transferred by ESM on 5 February 2013.  
March 19, 2013 The final €10bn support package for Cyprus financed partly by IMF (€1bn) and ESM 
(€9bn), featuring the direct closure of Laiki Bank and a forced bail-in recapitalisation 
plan for Bank of Cyprus.  
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Table 1 
European and US Banks 
This table identifies the banks in our sample. Banks are assigned to countries based on the Datastream 
classification. Obs. refers to the available number of observations (CDS spread) for each bank in the sample. 
Total assets (December 2012 data) are expressed in thousand euros. For non-euro countries the Datastream 
average exchange rate in December 2012 is used.  
 
Country Bank Name Obs. Total Assets  
Euro-Peripheral (20) 
      
Greece (4) National Bank of Greece  915 104,798 
 
Alpha Bank  2,407 58,357 
 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias  1,935 67,653 
 
Piraeus Bank  927 70,406 
Italy (7) Unicredito Italiano 2,407 926,827 
Intesa San paolo 2,407 673,475 
Banca Monte Paschi Siena 2,407 197,081 
Unione di Banche Italiane (Ubi Banca) 2,364 132,433 
Banco Popolare  2,402 131,921 
Banco Popolare Milano 2,407 52,475 
Banca Italease  1,516 10,531 
Portugal (3) Banco Espirito Santo 2,407 83,690 
Banco Comercial Português   2,407 89,744 
Banco Português de Investimento 2,407 44,564 
Spain (6) Banco Santander 2,407 1,269,628 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 2,407 637,785 
Banco Popular Español 2,407 157,618 
Banco de Sabadell 1,496 161,547 
Bankinter 2,004 58,165 
Banco Pastor 2,263 31,135 
Euro-Core (16) 
      
Austria  (2) Erste Group Bank 2,407 213,824 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank  2,407 145,955 
Belgium (2) KBC Bank 2,405 224,824 
Dexia 2,407 357,210 
France (5) BNP Paribas 2,407 1,907,290 
Société Générale 2,407 1,250,696 
Crédit Agricole 2,406 1,842,361 
Natixis 2,407 528,370 
BPCE SA  1,904 1,147,521 
Germany (4) Deutsche Bank  2,407 2,012,329 
Commerzbank  2,407 635,878 
Deutsche Postbank  2,380 193,822 
HSH Nordbank   2,407 130,606 
Netherlands (3) ING Bank NV 2,407 836,068 
Rabobank 2,407 752,410 
ABN AMRO Bank 2,407 394,404 
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Table 1 (continued) 
European and US Banks  
 
Country Bank Name Obs. Total Assets  
Non-Euro (14) 
      
Denmark (1) Danske Bank 2,394 466,708 
Norway (1) DNB NOR ASA 1,274 273,743 
Sweden (4) Nordea Bank  2,407 677,309 
Svenska Handelsbanken  2,407 276,972 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  2,407 285,047 
Swedbank  2,294 214,572 
Switzerland (1) Credit Suisse Group  2,407 752,006 
UK (7) HSBC Holdings PLC 2,407 3,318,590 
Lloyds Banking Group 2,407 1,139,523 
Standard Chartered 2,050 784,517 
Alliance and Leicester PLC 2,090 92,739 
Barclays 2,407 1,837,366 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 2,407 1,617,422 
HBOS 2,407 717,455 
US (5) Bank of America corporation 2,407 1,673,231 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2,407 1,786,754 
US Bancorp 1,314 268,001 
Wells Fargo & Co. 2,406 1,077,720 
  Citigroup Inc. 2,407 1,412,247 
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Table 2 
Bank CDS returns pair-wise correlations 
This table illustrates the pair-wise correlations of bank CDS returns for all the countries in our sample. The banks in the sample are allocated in equally weighted portfolios, using average CDS 
data for the banks included in each country. Results are shown for the whole sample period (January 2004 to March 2013). 
 
 Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK 
Austria 1,0000 
Belgium 0,2497 1,0000 
Denmark 0,2150 0,3027 1,0000 
France 0,2908 0,4809 0,3130 1,0000 
Germany 0,3304 0,4939 0,3331 0,6274 1,0000 
Greece 0,0793 0,0788 0,0686 0,1084 0,0905 1,0000 
Italy 0,2871 0,4788 0,3530 0,6368 0,6487 0,1418 1,0000 
Netherlands 0,2999 0,5565 0,3510 0,6515 0,7081 0,0969 0,6842 1,0000 
Norway 0,3467 0,3042 0,3285 0,4284 0,3683 0,0668 0,3516 0,3830 1,0000 
Portugal 0,2226 0,3830 0,2160 0,4761 0,4989 0,1556 0,5631 0,5237 0,2410 1,0000 
Spain 0,2901 0,4516 0,3254 0,5487 0,5593 0,1753 0,6485 0,6133 0,3332 0,6272 1,0000 
Sweden 0,2602 0,3259 0,4267 0,3944 0,4025 0,0873 0,4197 0,4271 0,6186 0,3002 0,4086 1,0000 
Switzerland 0,2596 0,5016 0,2754 0,6408 0,6981 0,0962 0,6449 0,7837 0,3605 0,4909 0,5343 0,3723 1,0000 
UK 0,3370 0,5101 0,3309 0,6696 0,7329 0,0836 0,6788 0,8181 0,4279 0,5258 0,5949 0,4393 0,7867 1,0000 
US 0,1934 0,3128 0,2369 0,3941 0,4588 0,0742 0,4492 0,5036 0,2187 0,3143 0,3455 0,2581 0,4866 0,5109 
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Table 3 
 Descriptive statistics of European and US bank CDS spread and return series  
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation) for the daily 5-year CDS spreads (Panel A) and returns (Panel B). The banks in the sample 
are allocated in equally weighted portfolios, by geographic area, using average CDS data for the banks in the countries included in each geographical area. CDS spreads are reported in basis 
points and CDS returns in percentage form. Results are shown for the whole sample period (January 2004 to March 2013), and for three sub-periods: January 2004 to June 2007 (Pre-Crisis), 
July 2007 to September 2009 (Global Financial Crisis) and October 2009 to March 2013 (European Sovereign Debt Crisis). The lack of statistics for Norway in the first sub-period is due to the 
lack of data for the Norwegian bank until May 2008. Note that the indication of the reference period as "pre-crisis"; "global financial crisis" and "eurozone crisis" is only an approximation for 
ease of discussion. We do not impose specific time periods, as the estimations are carried out on a 200-day rolling window.  
 
Panel A  
CDS spreads 
  Jan2004-Mar2013 
Pre-Crisis                                      
Jan2004-Jun2007 
Financial Global Crisis                                            
Jul2007-Sep2009 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis              
Oct2009-Mar2013 
  Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std 
Euro-Peripheral 12.91 1,625.26 277.91 358.01 12.91 31.02 19.46 4.15 19.58 216.25 100.70 50.29 113.47 1,625.26 652.67 332.44 
Greece 15.00 4,190.93 491.38 726.29 15.00 41.00 25.66 5.52 21.59 172.55 34.61 34.49 147.00 4,190.93 1,255.79 679.28 
Italy 9.07 694.93 157.47 164.88 9.07 36.87 20.60 6.42 21.83 379.23 144.21 80.34 67.72 694.93 303.69 166.10 
Portugal 10.50 1,483.58 273.57 371.12 10.50 31.39 16.75 4.49 17.63 171.09 86.56 35.62 79.30 1,483.58 653.04 362.88 
Spain 10.38 769.58 189.22 205.70 10.38 23.19 14.81 2.95 17.08 309.62 137.43 92.55 121.75 769.58 398.16 175.33 
Euro-Core 10.13 384.93 110.31 97.36 10.13 35.10 15.68 3.78 24.37 274.42 119.84 61.30 98.31 384.93 199.27 75.69 
Austria 3.83 510.25 123.24 97.85 3.83 117.83 26.05 17.03 74.15 510.25 170.10 100.35 123.05 364.59 190.60 55.97 
Belgium 5.50 709.49 175.81 185.52 5.50 13.40 9.75 1.48 10.60 395.70 172.89 100.86 136.14 709.49 344.68 168.79 
France 5.18 356.17 89.69 83.65 5.18 58.23 14.96 8.39 9.92 156.01 78.85 35.29 60.32 356.17 171.87 72.42 
Germany 10.22 276.11 87.01 66.20 10.22 37.10 19.09 5.35 16.25 182.29 99.02 44.56 88.95 276.11 147.53 43.83 
Netherlands 3.83 254.40 75.77 67.83 3.83 14.53 8.54 2.88 6.83 172.73 78.35 38.16 64.07 254.40 141.68 48.63 
Non-Euro 7.50 245.60 75.42 64.06 7.50 18.70 12.80 2.89 11.19 227.82 91.65 51.99 63.79 245.60 127.86 47.59 
Denmark 1.00 344.80 83.59 89.72 1.00 21.00 8.80 4.16 4.10 225.00 81.76 61.97 60.56 344.80 158.91 86.72 
Norway 37.50 212.00 100.46 39.37 - - - - 37.50 188.11 103.21 41.18 49.54 212.00 99.35 38.55 
Sweden 9.63 242.38 68.69 57.92 9.63 25.43 15.93 4.02 13.17 242.38 88.46 65.27 67.00 216.96 108.92 38.15 
Switzerland 9.20 262.88 74.68 57.55 9.20 25.50 16.25 4.17 17.50 262.88 99.82 51.36 52.80 213.45 117.14 37.65 
UK 4.37 285.29 88.50 74.20 4.37 20.40 10.11 3.01 9.97 230.15 107.52 50.30 77.90 285.29 154.98 46.14 
US 8.13 337.73 86.39 68.21 8.13 30.93 17.67 6.01 14.53 337.73 123.78 71.26 74.15 262.02 131.25 36.76 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 Descriptive statistics of European and US bank CDS spread and return series  
 
Panel B 
CDS returns 
  Jan2004-Mar2013 
Pre-Crisis                                         
Jan2004-Jun2007 
Financial Global Crisis                                            
Jul2007-Sep2009 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis            
Oct2009-Mar2013 
  Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std 
Euro-Peripheral -529.32 1,113.66 -0.38 45.77 -20.17 24.82 0.04 2.64 -119.99 49.87 -0.56 15.17 -529.32 1,113.66 -0.69 73.48 
Greece -1,679.64 4,246.79 0.12 141.40 -46.03 66.70 0.06 6.21 -429.05 38.91 -0.75 21.06 -1,679.64 4,246.79 0.75 229.58 
Italy -207.26 290.88 -0.58 29.73 -28.04 18.66 0.06 3.49 -145.56 168.71 -0.23 26.75 -207.26 290.88 -1.46 43.20 
Portugal -312.20 527.90 -0.52 47.21 -26.66 26.85 0.03 5.48 -143.22 97.19 -0.56 19.29 -312.20 527.90 -1.05 75.10 
Spain -199.67 305.07 -0.54 31.15 -35.43 34.18 0.02 2.81 -147.80 134.64 -0.69 22.13 -199.67 305.07 -1.01 47.41 
Euro-Core -136.94 162.02 -0.22 18.65 -71.55 49.50 0.04 10.50 -136.94 105.44 -0.53 21.51 -120.39 162.02 -0.29 22.63 
Austria -345.24 289.12 -0.14 37.83 -345.24 224.47 -0.07 46.10 -246.66 289.12 -0.31 39.66 -150.47 210.10 -0.11 25.34 
Belgium -366.81 246.17 -0.40 30.44 -11.74 11.46 0.00 2.20 -366.81 246.17 -0.95 40.42 -220.90 204.95 -0.44 37.33 
France -179.67 222.69 -0.22 24.30 -179.67 153.02 0.10 19.88 -114.20 80.18 -0.40 18.69 -159.43 222.69 -0.44 30.71 
Germany -168.58 116.51 -0.12 17.11 -77.69 94.34 0.12 9.37 -111.95 107.78 -0.59 19.11 -168.58 116.51 -0.05 21.24 
Netherlands -146.38 115.22 -0.24 16.80 -9.33 9.49 0.02 1.51 -146.38 115.22 -0.40 22.90 -71.83 113.77 -0.40 20.16 
Non-Euro -96.17 102.68 -0.15 13.60 -16.88 14.75 0.02 2.79 -96.17 83.68 -0.41 18.28 -81.73 102.68 -0.15 16.32 
Denmark -392.76 209.57 -0.21 20.09 -64.29 36.70 0.01 6.37 -392.76 209.57 -0.43 26.32 -167.62 150.21 -0.27 23.99 
Norway -202.99 157.05 -0.10 19.70 - - - - -202.99 157.05 -0.01 26.08 -126.47 112.43 -0.13 16.44 
Sweden -188.22 100.05 -0.12 12.54 -24.14 21.53 0.04 3.43 -188.22 69.78 -0.46 18.09 -73.63 100.05 -0.06 13.90 
Switzerland -167.31 195.38 -0.13 21.15 -24.68 21.98 -0.01 2.95 -167.31 195.38 -0.35 30.97 -142.30 186.97 -0.10 23.58 
UK -191.07 227.54 -0.16 21.97 -43.43 45.80 0.03 7.78 -191.07 227.54 -0.45 30.34 -103.86 182.30 -0.17 24.95 
US -178.96 230.81 -0.13 24.60 -19.23 14.69 0.02 2.45 -178.96 230.81 -0.85 40.16 -168.85 118.20 0.20 23.53 
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Table 4 
Robustness Tests 
The table reports the results of additional analyses, for systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. Panel A reports the key differences 
in results when using portfolios weighted by total assets. The original analysis was carried out using equally weighted portfolios. 
Panel B reports the results when excluding the portfolio of US banks from the analysis. The sample period is January 2004 to 
March 2013, but the indices start in October 2004, since a 200-day rolling window is used to obtain the evolution over time. Note 
that only remarkable differences in the values of the spillover indices (and relative dates) are displayed. TS is the total spillover 
index. NDS is the net directional spillover index and NPS is net pairwise spillover index. US is the portfolio of CDS returns of US 
banks. EP is the portfolio of CDS returns of euro-peripheral banks. EC is the portfolio of CDS returns of euro-core banks. NE is 
the portfolio of CDS returns of non- euro banks. 
 
 
Panel A: Equally Weighted portfolios vs. Weighted portfolios by total assets 
 Systematic Contagion Idiosyncratic Contagion 
 
Equally Weighted  
portfolios 
Weighted  
portfolios  
Equally Weighted 
portfolios 
Weighted  
portfolios  
Dates 2006Q1-Q3 Aug 2007 
TS index 47.70%  
on average 
62.44%  
on average 
A peak of  
16.23% A peak of 37.46% 
NDS 
& 
NPS 
indices 
US net receiver of 
systematic contagion 
(26.88% on average): 2.60%, 
11.32% and 12.96%, from 
EP, EC and NE, respectively 
US net receiver of systematic 
contagion  
(43.38% on average): 15.26%, 
13.17% and 14.95%, from EP, 
EC and NE, respectively  
EP receives 
on average 
 0.81% and 0.75% from 
US and NE, respectively 
EP receives  
on average 12.8% and 
14.1% from US and 
NE, respectively 
 
Panel B: Without the US 
 
Systematic Contagion Idiosyncratic Contagion 
Dates Aug 07 Jul 2007 – Dec 07 May 10 Sep 11  Oct 11 May 12 – Mar 13 
TS index A peak of 74.58% 
61.23% 
on average 
A peak of 
35.01% 
A peak of 
40.43% 
A peak of 
44.36% 
21.26%  
on average 
TS index 
Excluding US 
A peak of 
58.64% 
47.40% 
on average 
7.45% 
on average 
A peak of 
20.50% 
A peak of 
24.45% 
11.98%  
on average 
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Figure 1 
Principal Component Analysis  
This figure reports the time evolution of the proportion of variance (in percentage) explained by the first four principal 
components of banks’ CDS returns series. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2013, but the figure starts in October 2004 
since a 200-day rolling window is used to obtain the evolution over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
 
 
Contribution of first PC
Sum of first two PC
Sum of first three PC
Sum of first four PC
 45 
 
Figure 2 
Time evolution of CDS spreads and returns series 
Panel A: Daily time series of CDS spreads (in basis points); Panel B: Daily time series of CDS returns. Panel A and Panel B 
report the CDS spreads and returns for the four equally weighted portfolios, sorted by the geographical area where banks are 
headquartered. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2013. The scale in the euro-peripheral portfolio is from 0 to 1,800 
(Panel A) and from -8 to 12 (Panel B); in all other portfolios the scale is from 0 to 400 (Panel A) and from -3 to 3 (Panel B). 
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Figure 3 
 Total return spillover index 
This figure reports the time evolution of the total return spillover index for systematic contagion (TSI-SC in black), computed 
using systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (TSI-IC in grey), computed using idiosyncratic CDS returns. It 
measures (on average) the percentage of the forecast error variance in all the series that comes from contagion due to shocks. 
Returns of the four equally weighted portfolios sorted by geographical area are used. The sample period is January 2004 to March 
2013, but the index starts in October 2004, since a 200-day rolling window is used to obtain the evolution over time. 
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Figure 4 
Net directional return spillover indices 
This figure reports the time evolution of the net directional return spillover indices for systematic contagion (in black), computed 
using systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (in grey), computed using idiosyncratic returns. They measure the 
spillover due to shocks (in percentage terms) transmitted by each portfolio to all others. Positive (negative) values indicate that the 
corresponding portfolio is, in net terms, a transmitter (receiver) of return spillover effects to all others. Returns of the four equally 
weighted portfolios sorted by geographical area are used. Panel A illustrates the net directional spillovers from the euro-peripheral 
portfolio to all others. Panel B illustrates the net directional spillovers from the euro-core portfolio to all others. Panel C illustrates 
the net directional spillovers from the non-euro portfolio to all others. Finally, Panel D illustrates the net directional spillovers 
from the US portfolio to all others. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2013, but the indices start on October 2004 since 
a 200-days rolling window is used to get the evolution over time. 
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Figure 5 
Net pairwise return spillover relationships 
This figure reports the time evolution of the net pairwise return spillover indices for systematic contagion (in black), computed using systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (in 
grey), computed using idiosyncratic returns. They measure the net spillover due to shocks (in percentage terms) transmitted between each pair of portfolios. Returns of the four equally 
weighted portfolios, sorted by geographical area, are used. EP, EC, NE and US refers to euro-peripheral (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain); euro-core (Austria, Belgium, France Germany and 
Netherlands), non-euro (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and US, respectively. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2013; the time evolution of pairwise 
relationships is also summarized in three sub-periods: the pre-crisis period (January 2004 – June 2007), the financial crisis period (July 2007 – September 2009) and the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis period (October 2009 – March 2013). Note that the division into the three sub-periods is an approximation for ease of discussion as the GVAR estimations are carried out on a 200-
day rolling window framework. 
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Figure 6 
Comparison with Market Indices 
The figure (Panel A, B, C, D and E) illustrates the time evolution of a sovereign CDS index that reflects the average of all 
sovereign CDS spreads in the sample at particular points in time over the sample period. Note that data on US sovereign CDS are 
available only from before December 2007. Prior to that, the Sovereign CDS Index includes only European countries. Panel F and 
G reflects the evolution over time of two stock returns portfolios for the Greek and Spanish banks in our sample to show the 
average stock returns (Greek Banks Stock Returns Index and Spanish Banks Stock Returns Index). 
 
Sovereign CDS index 
Panel A. April 2007- January 2008 Panel B. 2008 
Panel C. 2010 Panel D. October 2009-March 2013 
Panel E. September-December  2012 
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Figure 6 (continued) 
Comparison with Market Indices 
Bank Stock returns index 
Panel F. Greek Banks (2010) Panel G. Spanish Banks (September-December  2012) 
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Figure 7 
 Total return spillover index (within euro-peripheral) 
This figure reports the time evolution of the total return spillover index for systematic contagion (in black), computed using 
systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (in grey), computed using idiosyncratic CDS returns. It measures (on 
average) the percentage of the forecast error variance in all the series that comes from contagion due to shocks. CDS returns for 
equally weighted portfolio of banks in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are used. The sample period is June 2009 to March 2013, 
but the index starts in March 2010, since a 200-day rolling window is used to obtain the evolution over time. 
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Figure 8 
Net directional return spillover indices (within euro-peripheral) 
This figure reports the time evolution of the net directional return spillover indices for systematic contagion (in black), computed 
using systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (in grey), computed using idiosyncratic returns. They measure the 
spillover due to shocks (in percentage terms) transmitted by each portfolio to all others. Positive (negative) values indicate that the 
corresponding portfolio is, in net terms, a transmitter (receiver) of return spillover effects to all others. CDS returns for equally 
weighted portfolio of banks in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are used. Panel A illustrates the net directional spillovers from 
Greece to all others. Panel B illustrates the net directional spillovers from Italy to all others. Panel C illustrates the net directional 
spillovers from Portugal to all others. Finally, Panel D illustrates the net directional spillovers from Spain to all others. The sample 
period is June 2009 to March 2013, but the index starts in March 2010, since a 200-day rolling window is used to obtain the 
evolution over time. 
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Figure 9 
Net pairwise return spillover relationships (within euro-peripheral) 
This figure summarizes the time evolution of the net pairwise return spillover indices for systematic contagion (in black), 
computed using systematic CDS returns, and idiosyncratic contagion (in grey), computed using idiosyncratic returns. They 
measure the net spillover due to shocks (in percentage terms) transmitted between each pair of portfolios. CDS returns for equally 
weighted portfolio of banks in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are used. The sample period is June 2009 to March 2013. 
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